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RECENT BOOKS 
LAW AND SocIAL PROCESS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY. By James Willard 
Hurst. Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Law School, 
1960. Pp. xvii, 361. $6. 
For many years Willard Hurst has been thinking long and hard about 
law and life in these United States. From time to time he has put his 
thoughts in writing: The Growth of American Law and Law and the Con-
ditions of Freedom in the Nineteenth Century United States were pioneer-
ing works; his law review articles have also been guideposts to his thinking.1 
Here in Law and Social Process in United States History is set forth Pro-
fessor Hurst's philosophy of legal history. He would eschew the word 
"philosophy" just as he would disavow "jurisprudence" because both terms 
encompass a universality he does not claim. It is with the role of law in 
the United States, and it alone, that he deals. Yet jurisprudence and 
philosophy intrude on every page of this book-the published version of 
the 1959 Thomas M. Cooley lectures at the University of Michigan Law 
School. 
Four features, Hurst finds, have shaped law's character in United States 
history: force (placing in government the legitimate monopoly of violence); 
constitutionalism (our tradition that official power is accountable, that 
the legal order is not an end in itself but is meant to serve human life); 
procedure (the formal ways of finding facts, making choices, and relating 
general propositions to particular instances); and resource allocation (the 
use of law as one important means to distribute resources so as to affect 
life's conditions). 
With a scholar's caution, Hurst, in his chapter called "Drift and 
Direction," urges us not to exaggerate law's role in United States history. 
Change, he says, has been the dominant, and stability the recessive, charac-
teristic of our experience, not because of conscious direction, but resulting 
from accidents of time and place: a vast, new land endowed with physical 
wealth, a people of middle-class outlook and Protestant ethic ideally suited 
to populate and develop that land, a state of knowledge historically ready 
for use. All these combined to produce a society of great opportunity in 
1 THE GROWTii OF AMERICAN LAw: THE LAWMAKERS (1950); LAw AND THE CoNDmONS 
OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY UNITED STATES (1958); Content of Courses in 
Legislation, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 280 (1941); Legal History: A Research Program, 1942 Wis. 
L. REv. 232; Uses of Law in Four "Colonial" States of the American Union, 1945 WIS. 
L. REv. 577; (With B. R. Brown), Perils of the Test Case-An Episode in the History 
of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1949 WIS. L. REv. 26; Who is the "Great" Appellate 
Judge?, 24 IND. L. J. 362 (1949); Law and the Balance of Power in the Community, 6 
R.EcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 149 (1951); Research Responsibilities of University Law Schools, 
10 J. LEGAL ED. 147 (1957); Funds for Individual Legal Research, 12 J. LEGAL ED. 592 
(1960). 
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which people could live far above marginal subsistence, in which class and 
religious struggles were largely absent, and in which the scale of operations 
was typically big. These massive facts of history, ramified by cumulation 
(the sum and total of our culture), context (the sheer volume and com-
plexity of extrinsic forces compared to the small area in which directed 
effort could play), and pace (the rapidity of change in our history), decreed 
that unplanned drift should be the id, and purposed direction the super-
ego of our national personality. 
Yet Hurst is no Savigny describing a Zeitgeist with a life of its own. 
The social role of law added only a marginal increment to the sum of the 
causes that made us what we are, but this increment was critically im-
portant. For it is a central function of law, Hurst says, to see that major 
decisions are not taken by default. So, after warning us not to give too 
much importance to law and after making it clear that drift prevailed over 
direction, he proceeds to show-and this is the substance of his book-how 
law operated to achieve purposed direction, or, at times, how he felt it 
it could have operated but didn't. 
He turns-in his chapter, "Initiative and Response"-to the way law 
fostered purposed direction by helping man see the facts of his situation 
and the nature of his problems. Here, as elsewhere, Hurst notes that law's 
role was conditioned by a unique pragmatism having both true and bastard 
strains. It was the bastard strain that disabled us from distinguishing 
management from opportunism, egalitarianism from mediocrity, dispersion 
of power from parochialism. It was the bastard strain also, hell-bent for 
getting things done quickly, that drained off our energies entirely to private 
affairs in the post-Civil War years and, a generation later, made us com-
pletely production-minded. These two sides of our pragmatism are not so 
easy to distinguish as Hurst makes it seem, but at least one role of a pro-
fessor, I suppose, is to tell the rest of us which is the good turtle soup and 
which is the mock.2 
Hurst finds that the procedural and constitutional character of our law 
helped increase purposeful initiative in our society by fostering "creative 
tension between form and substance and between generals and particulars." 
(p. 13 I) By form he means the definition our legal system gives to the 
formal procedures for finding facts, for weighing those facts, for making 
choices of ends and means, and for determining which choices should be 
backed with public policy and power. "By channeling into law's forms the 
flow of life's substance from outside the law we increased purposeful initia-
tive in at least four ways: attracting desire, cultivating awareness, economiz-
ing effort, and legitimating will." (p. 137) 
The availability of the law's formal process attracted desire by providing 
2 Cf. Porter, "At Long Last Love," You NEVER KNOW (1938). 
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a realizable goal to men: viz., possession of the powers of government, 
whether legislative, executive, or, to a lesser extent, judicial, for purposes 
of molding public policy to their liking. It cultivated awareness by insisting 
on precise definition as a condition of getting what men wanted from law 
(a bill to be drawn, pleadings to be filed, forms to be filled out), by focusing 
men's attention on the political dimension of life (if men lacked the market 
power to get their way, they might seek a statute from the legislature or 
file a suit at law), and by providing means of communication among people 
of diverse points of view (national political parties provide the best 
example). The availability of law's forms economized effort by helping to 
concentrate intelligence and disciplined feeling in one spot, particularly 
in the legislature; and it legitimated will by providing regular and estab-
lished forms through which social change must move. 
Hurst's discussion of the creative tension that legal structures and proc-
esses fostered between generals and particulars-he calls it a special instance 
of the interplay of form and substance-is more difficult to grasp. One 
example he finds in the kind of legislative authority we inherited. The 
legislature of Revolutionary and Federal years-with its power of the purse, 
its power of investigation, its police power-was designed to deal with the 
large framework of social living. Yet as we broadened the elective base 
of the legislature, shortened the terms of office, and insisted on geographical 
districts, we thrust matters of extreme particularity through the legislative 
process until, Hurst fears, we have created a parochialism that raises doubts 
about the legislature's capacity to produce generalizations adequate to the 
times. 
This interplay of generals and particulars he finds also in the authority 
vested in the courts to declare and supply values reaching beyond the imme-
diate bounds of the litigants' claims (limited, to be sure, by the format of 
a lawsuit), and, after about 1905, in the expansion of the executive branch, 
particularly through the administrative agencies, which provides the most 
striking structural development of mingled emphases on general and par-
ticular. The American philosophy of constitutionalism also proscribed 
areas within which the competition of generals and particulars operated: 
the concept of "reasonable," the development of the substantive meaning 
of due process and equal protection, the definitions of police power and 
the commerce clause, and, in the twentieth century, the expanding fiscal 
authority of the central government. 
Turning to the weight given to particulars, the key proposition, Hurst 
says, is that, under our constitution, law exists to serve the individual-in 
a sense, the ultimate of human particularity. Examples are the Bill of 
Rights, the hedge we put around the highest crime against the political 
community, treason (on which Hurst, incidentally, is an authority3), and, 
s Treason in the United States, 58 HARV. L. REv. 226, 395, 806 (1944-45); English 
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of course, the work of the judicial branch, which provides the most dis-
tinctive form in law for expression of particular wants and desires. 
After looking at how law-through initiative and response-gave pur-
posed direction to our history, Hurst turns-in his chapter, "Leverage and 
Support"-to what law did. Whereas law's role in stimulating initiative 
and response went to the constitutional and procedural aspects of our legal 
history, leverage and support concerned the resource allocation feature. 
By leverage Hurst means the use of law to help create new knowledge 
or purpose or action, and by support, its use to maintain values already 
formed. He takes each chapter of the 1853 General Acts of Wisconsin and 
classifies it as either a leverage or a support statute. He also uses the legal 
history of milk regulation in Wisconsin to illustrate the distinction: a 
statute defining minimum behavior by milk producers and dealers is an 
example of the support role because it sustained an already existing frame 
of relations in Wisconsin life; contrariwise, acts creating specialized agencies 
to gather information and initiate plans about milk supply and quality-
the state university, the office of food and dairy commissioner, the depart-
ment of agriculture-manifested law's leverage effect since they gave new 
impulse to action in the regulation of milk. 
The leverage role, which we have never hesitated to assume, has always 
been a part of our social structure. Again the bastard pragmatism intrudes: 
we tend to use the leverage function only for objects close at hand and 
readily seen, and we granted, largely by default, a tremendous delegation 
of power to the market for the purposes of developing our natural resources 
and fixing the patterns of sectional and national commerce. 
Hurst discovers four main expressions of the law's leverage function: 
(1) legitimating and arming men with capacity to make choices of action-
e.g., the delegation of powers to the three major branches of government 
and to private initiative under licensing; (2) legitimating sources of dissent 
and criticism-e.g., the veto of the chief executive, the two-chamber legis-
lature, the unusual tenure of United States Senators, life tenure for federal 
judges, chartering of religious and educational institutions; (3) helping 
advance and exploit knowledge-e.g., the legislative power of investigation, 
the corraling of expertise and opinion by the executive, the creation of 
scientific and research organizations by the legislature, the appellate court 
opinion which defines the assumptions of fact and judgment implicit in 
existing policy; and (4) providing means for more rationalized law-making 
-e.g., the Field code, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, the devel-
opment of rule-making by administrative agencies. 
Hurst avoids assigning relative importance to the leverage and support 
Sources of the American Law of Treason, 1945 Wis. L. REv. 315; The Historic Back-
ground of the Treason Clause of the United States Constitution, 6 FED. B.J. 305 (1945). 
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functions of law. But he does find that the support role loomed larger in 
the simpler days of our society, and, concerned as it was with keeping social 
processes going, it necessarily dealt in great part with law's own order. 
Four general themes in our history, he suggests, gave coherence to law's 
support functions: continuity, economic productivity, context, and com-
munity. The law supported social continuity by enforcing free access to 
our cultural inheritance: e.g., through sanctioning a free press and free 
church, prohibiting feudal tenures, establishing compulsory public educa-
tion, extending the suffrage, according favor to freedom of contract, limiting 
the years of a patent or copyright. The law encouraged economic produc-
tivity by supplying techniques that produced multiplier effects from invest-
ing relatively scarce cash and manpower, and thus provided a climate in 
which the economy could grow: e.g., favoring use of the corporation, con-
trolling credit and public land policy, and giving federal protection to 
national markets. As more importance surrounded this aspect in the twen-
tieth century, Hurst finds that law's greatest failure is in meeting the chal-
lenge of urban living. The law contributed to context-i.e., the concern 
for the efficiency and decency of working relations men have to each other 
-both directly (discussed at length in Hurst's last chapter) and indirectly 
through supporting broad freedom of association in education, welfare, 
religion, and business. The law abetted community-i.e., man's life in 
society and his satisfaction in that life-by supporting attitudes that made 
United States society in the nineteenth century, with the sole and tragic 
exception of the American Negro, one of consensus, without significant 
class or religious conflict. The fact that men in general found life satisfying 
was a gift of time and place that the law supported, sometimes at the price 
of imbalance of power and over-concentration of wealth. 
In his final chapter, "Force and Fruition," Hurst discusses the law's 
basic characteristic of force, which he calls merely a direct manifestation 
of the role of leverage and support. The legitimate monopoly of violence, 
Hurst says, is the most distinct attribute of our law. From his words in this 
chapter he will undoubtedly be branded by the natural lawyers as a wicked 
and brutal positivist. Such a branding would be unfair because, after 
stating this bald fact of life-i.e., that force is the distinct attribute-Hurst 
emphasizes again and again that it is the secondary or indirect or reserved 
use of force that has counted for success in our law. Success, in other words, 
of placing the legitimate monopoly of force in the law is measured by how 
little force need be used. 
What he says in his last chapter is perhaps not so novel as what he has 
said earlier, and he covers ground familiar to all lawyers. He observes that 
force, when it must be used, always plays a negative role. That is to say, 
it is used to avoid something worse-namely, the breakdown of legal order 
itself. And we have always believed that power over the legitimate monop• 
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oly of violence exists to serve individual life and must always be held in 
check. Ultimately this power must account to the electorate, but over 
the years we have developed four4 additional safeguards in our formal legal 
processes: (1) the civilian control of the military; (2) the limitations on 
political disqualification (for example, the narrow definition of treason, 
the prohibition of bills of attainder or ex post facto laws, the forbidding 
of religious tests as qualifications to public office, the guarantee of trial by 
jury, the absolute privilege of legislators against libel and slander); (3) the 
protection of limited political commitment (i.e., the concern of the law only 
with man's overt acts and not with his inner thoughts or feelings, and the 
general refusal-relaxed somewhat in the 1950's-to recognize guilt by asso-
ciation); and (4) the accountability of civil authority (e.g., the internal 
checks and balances of government, the protection of dissent, and most 
important, Hurst believes, the role of court and bar in reviewing official 
action). 
As we enter the second half of the twentieth century Hurst finds new 
developments in the indirect use of force through preventive law techniques 
such as licensing and administrative rule-making, through the expansion of 
taxation and public spending, and through the use of advisory committees. 
He also sees Madison Avenue extending into official operations: the com-
mon inclusion of public information officers in the typical public agency 
table of organization causes him some concern; for they can hoard knowl-
edge and withhold facts as well as improve the quality of performance. 
Nor does Hurst feel we can rest complacently in the belief that faith in 
our constitutional tradition alone is enough to give us all the security we 
need against abuse of official power; since law holds the ultimate means 
of violence, possession of government itself is a natural prize of ambition, 
greed and passion. On this rather somber note he stops. 
Hurst has done here, I believe, what has not been done before. He has 
related law to life in United States legal history as a systematic whole. 
Others-McDougal and Lasswell, Edmond Cahn, Jerome Frank, Underhill 
Moore, Karl Llewellyn, and more-have either done this kind of job in 
specialized fields or have approached it from a priori precepts. But none, 
I suggest, has given us a unified, compact, and cohesive account of law and 
social process between the covers of a single book. 
This work is the product of prodigious scholarship in the behavioral 
sciences. To use Selig Perlman's phrase, Hurst has placed himself in the 
4 Like the American Indians of the Great Plains, Hurst seems to be intrigued 
with the number four: thus, he finds four distinctive features of our legal order (pp. 3-5); 
four ways we increased purposeful initiative through the interaction of life's substance 
with law's forms (p. 137); four main expressions of law's leverage function (p. 194); 
four ways in which the support functions of law maintained values (p. 226); and four 
principles to prevent subversion of the law's legitimate force (p. 311). See KRoEBER, 
ANTHROPOLOGY 253 n.l (1923). 
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middle of a problem and crossed all jurisdictional bounds. He has at-
tempted to live by his creed that a historian is a man who can see aii event 
whole. The fact that no man can ever possess such vision is no reason not 
to try. 
Of course there will be controversy aplenty. The book abounds with 
generalizations about the nature of man-a species located somewhere be-
tween St. Francis and Mack the Knife-that should shake many boughs in 
the groves of Academe. Will historian and political scientist agree that 
change and not stability has been the norm of our experience? Does it 
square with current social anthropology, or even traditional theology, that, 
survival aside, "man's primary problem as man, has been to make some 
sense for himself out of experience" (p. 102) or that in North American 
society "men felt that the human meaning in life lay in their search to 
create meaning"? (p. 64) What will the psychiatrist, Freudian or other-
wise, say about "the unique quality of the human brain has proved to be 
its capacity for general and flexible rather than specialized adaptation"? 
(p. 105) How consistent with contemporary biology and anthropology is 
"life consisted in organization imposed on matter, and human life consisted 
in accomplishing this with maximum awareness"? (p. 108) Will the psy-
chologist concur in the statement that "[Men] do not think about what 
they see; they see what they think about"? (p. 141) Will sociologist and 
cultural anthropologist endorse the remark that "A man grew as an indi-
vidual by organizing ideas and emotions into relatively dependable habits 
of will which would press him beyond the limited objectives of his animal 
nature and sustain him against awareness of his lonely human condition"? 
(p. 227) How will theologians, metaphysicians, and philosophers react to, 
" ... the universe tendered [man] no meaning other than he perceived for 
himself" (p. 108), or to Hurst's discussion of what, if anything, the Present 
owes to the Past and the Future? Does "the Present [owe] the Future the 
chance to grow, because this is the only sense in which life has human 
meaning"? (p. 232) And how will a philosopher, hedonist or otherwise, 
feel about, "Satisfaction from human relations rests on exchange of ideas 
and feelings and not on mere response to stimuli or mere technical 
performance"? (p. 254) 
These are but a few of the generalizations that Hurst has formulated 
from other fields of learning, and I, for one, don't have the foggiest notion 
whether he has spoken the gospel or not. "When the smoke clears, though, 
it is a probable twelve to seven that he will be more right than wrong, and 
if what he says is more true than not true, he has sustained his burden of 
proof.5 Moreover, there are no souls around to say him nay because no 
one has tried to do this job before. In the country of the blind the one-
5 Cf. ILL. PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Instruction 21.01, at 16 (1961). 
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eyed man is king. Even if he is not right he will have served a great leverage 
function, if I may use the term, by stimulating comment, criticism, and 
carping. 
How remote this study is from anything traditionally regarded as legal 
history: obscure investigations into writs of Aiel, Besaiel, and Cosinage; 
empty and formalistic studies of the United States Supreme Court and the 
sifting committee; narratives of the Nullification controversy and the Dart-
mouth College case. As to the emphasis on high politics and dramatic in-
cidents, Hurst states: "I confess to some irritation that the writing of legal 
history tends to take the cream off the top of the bottle and let the nutri-
tious skimmed stuff flow down the drain because it is bulky to handle and 
not so immediately pleasing to taste." (p. 18) 
Hurst has exploded some tough and tenacious myths. Let no one now 
perpetuate the fable of laisser faire. Hurst has shown how, time and time 
again, we have used law, consciously and affirmatively, to advance social 
or economic gain for purely selfish purpose. Let no one accept the easy 
generalization that we are a materialistic people; we used materialistic 
means, to be sure, but only for the ultimate objective of promoting ad-
vancement and expression of the individual. Similarly, the generality is 
a superficial one that we, as a people, have no respect for law. We are 
chronically impatient and we wanted to get on with the job; this gave 
us a matter of fact attitude toward government as an instrument of utility, 
not an object of awe. But that is not to say we were lacking in respect. 
We also tried to use law where it should and could not be used-e.g., the 
eighteenth amendment-and, as a result, had visited upon us a myriad of 
tragic consequences. 
Hurst's book should have an important impact in stimulating further 
studies. What we don't know about our own legal history is appalling, 
and much of what we do know has come from the studies of Willard Hurst 
and his students. Up to this time we have been content to leave the whole 
subject to the political scientists, but they have looked mainly at the formal 
structure of government or at political parties. This is anomalous: lawyers 
in their day to day operations are knee-deep in all the matters Hurst writes 
about; it is as though it were enough for us to do these things but never 
to think about them. 
The Odette-Odile nature of American pragmatism, for example, needs 
study in depth, for it provides, Hurst says, one of the organizing themes 
of the social history of law in the United States. From the standpoint of 
law's relation to realizing man's distinctive quality as man, he calls it the 
most important theme. The whole role of law in creating tensions be-
tween generals and particulars to aid purposeful direction, Hurst finds 
largely unexplored. The indirect use of force, he states, offers a rich mine 
of material in United States legal history. The law's performance in making 
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many irrevocable choices in men's lives, suggests much useful work to be 
done. And the variety of problems posed by assessment of the relation of 
law to increased economic productive capacity outlines an area of high 
priority. 
This book is hard to read. If Clifton Fadiman wants to spend another 
summer of "hard" reading, I recommend it to him heartily. Perhaps it 
could not be otherwise: a book about abstract matters must perforce use 
abstract language. Hurst has not helped matters much by his organization, 
which, at times, is confusingly loose. For instance, he discusses the fostering 
of creative tension between generals and particulars and between form 
and substance at two different places; for the more simple minded of us, 
it would have helped had he discussed each of them completely at one 
point. His characterization overlaps in many places, but, being no Aristo-
telian, he freely admits to this and in dealing with such general ideas we 
can hardly take him to task. 
To Hurst's credit, he has not invented a new vocabulary to describe 
his concepts. He has used words and phrases that have common usages, 
albeit outside the law. "Creative tension," for example, is not a lawyer's 
term; it is not even a law professor's term. Nor are "attracting desire," 
"energizing will," "cultivating awareness," "cumulation," "context," and 
many others. This is not to say that using language unfamiliar to lawyers 
is improper-perhaps it is high time that we begin to think in these 
terms-but its use, unadorned, makes the book hard to understand. A 
close reader, to be sure, will find explanations of key terms imbedded in 
this tight-packed prose, but some plain and simple definitions, qua defini-
tions, would have been a boon. And to make confusion more confounded 
Hurst has not used the same terms in referring to what, I believe, are 
the same things. For example, one has to assume that "purposeful" and 
"purposed" direction are the same, that "energizing will" (pp. 138, 140) is 
the same thing as "attracting desire" (p. 137); that "cultivating awareness" 
(p. 137), "sharpening perception" (p. 140), and "enlarging perception" 
(p. 160) are synonymous; that "competition" as between generals and par-
ticulars is the same as "creative tension." Conversely, Hurst has used one 
word-context-to describe two different concepts: the relationship of 
extrinsic forces to directed effort (pp. 71-72), and the kind of working rela-
tions that men have to one another (pp. 249-53). Granting that a book like 
this need not abide by the canons of drafting a utility indenture-where, on 
penalty of death, the same word must always be used to describe the same 
thing-a poor wretch of a practitioner finds himself wondering at times if 
he has correctly associated word to idea.6 
6 Remaining adverse comment runs only to minutiae. Hurst likes the noun-
adjective-verb: energize, legitimize, personalize. He has the second edition of Webster's 
Dictionary on his side, but not E. B. White ("As for us, we would as lief Simonize our 
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As must be obvious from the tenor of this review, I believe Professor 
Hurst has broken new paths again just' as he did twelve years ago in 
The Growth of American Law. Law and Social Process in the United States 
is a classic example of the product of a first-rate mind working on an in-
credibly complex and bulky body of material. The impact of this book, 
I suspect, will not be felt for some time to come; the number of people-
and I do not count myself one-who can read it with full comprehension 
may be few indeed. But if he has reached those who are at the well-springs 
of ideas and scholarship, he will have fulfilled a critical role. For if we 
are even to investigate, not to mention understand, the role of law in 
United States society, studies growing out of a work like this must be 
undertaken by the scholarly community throughout the land. When that 
job gets underway, and when its results begin to appear, the participants 
can look back to their intellectual birth in the historical world of Willard 
Hurst. 
Robert S. Hunt 
Member of the Illinois Bar 
grandmother as personalize our writing.'' VVHITE, THE SECOND TREE FROM THE CORNER 
166 (1954)). Professor Brinton's first name is "Crane" (p. 332); the title of Walton 
Hamilton's book is The Politics of Industry (p. 333); and why, of Gunnar Myrdal's 
works cited, is THE AMERICAN DILEMMA omitted? 
